Dr Ahmet Erdi Öztürk, a Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations, explains some key takeaways from the new trilateral alliance between Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey
Date: 4 September 2026
For decades, regional security was organised to a considerable degree around American power and guarantees. Neither has disappeared, but what has changed is the willingness of regional states to rely exclusively on such relationships.
Iraq, the Arab uprisings, shifting American priorities, the rise of China, the wars in Gaza and Ukraine, and growing uncertainty about the future international order have all encouraged states such as Saudi Arabia to hedge their bets.
The Mecca Defence Alliance between Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey - which was signed in August - aims to strengthen collective deterrence and stipulates that “any armed attack against any one of the three States shall be regarded as an attack against them all".
It can be seen as an attempt to move beyond strategic dependence, as regional powers pursue greater agency and more partnerships.
Ankara as an anchor power
For Turkey, the real significance of the pact comes from acting as a connector power. Its strategic value comes not only from its rapidly expanding defence industry, but also from its ability to connect different security, economic and political networks.
The Mecca Pact potentially strengthens this role by bringing together Turkish military-industrial capacity, Saudi financial resources and Pakistan’s substantial military might.
This does not mean that Ankara is choosing Mecca over Brussels or Washington. Quite the opposite. Turkey’s emerging strategy is based on the accumulation rather than the replacement of relationships.
For much of the Cold War and its aftermath, Turkey was routinely described as NATO’s eastern flank. That description is becoming increasingly inadequate. Ankara now wants to be something more ambitious: a strategic hinge connecting Europe, the Black Sea, the Middle East, the Gulf and South Asia.
Washington and Westminster watching on
Washington should resist interpreting arrangements such as the Mecca Pact as evidence of strategic defection, but instead as strategic autonomy. Turkey remains inside NATO. Saudi Arabia remains deeply connected to the American security architecture. Pakistan has its own complicated but enduring relationships with both Western and non-Western powers.
What these countries increasingly reject is not co-operation with the West but dependence. The United States may consequently remain the most powerful external actor in the region while becoming less capable of determining the entire network of relationships pursued by its partners. Paradoxically, accepting greater regional autonomy may preserve American influence more effectively than attempting to prevent it.
For Westminster, the change presents both a challenge and an opportunity. Black Sea security, European defence, Gulf security, defence-industrial cooperation and new transport and energy corridors are more interconnected. The UK, particularly as it continues to define its international role outside the European Union, has an interest in understanding and participating in these networks – particularly with Turkey.
The larger lesson of the Mecca Pact, then, is not that the West is disappearing. Nor does it demonstrate that a coherent post-Western order has arrived. What we are witnessing is something less dramatic but potentially more consequential: an international system with more centres of power, but still with clear hierarchies.
Dr Ahmet Erdi Öztürk is a Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations. He is the author of more than 20 peer-reviewed journal articles, policy reports and opinion pieces, and is regularly cited in media outlets such as openDemocracy, The Conversation, and HuffPost.